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Abstract
A large and increasing fraction of the value of executives’ compensation is ac-
counted for by security grants. It is often argued that the optimal compensation
contracts characterized in the theoretical literature can be implemented by means
of stock or option grants. However, in most cases the optimal allocation can be
implemented simply by a contingent sequence of cash payments. Security awards
are redundant. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of managerial compen-
sation where neither the firm nor the manager can commit to long-term contracts.
We show that, in this environment, if stock grants are not used, then the optimal
contract collapses to a series of short term contracts. When stock grants are
used, however, nonlinear intertemporal schemes can be implemented to achieve
better risk-sharing and greater firm value.
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1 Introduction
The theoretical literature on optimal managerial compensation with moral hazard has
long established that current and deferred compensation should be made contingent
on the value of the firm. Managers should be paid more when shareholder value is
higher, both in the current period and in the future. The compensation schemes that
we observe in use typically consist of current cash compensation, stock and option
grants, and promises of future cash compensation. It is often argued that stock
and option grants are natural means to implement contingent deferred compensation.
However, in the case of most models the optimal allocation can be implemented
simply by a sequence of contingent cash payments.1 Security awards are redundant
instruments, in the sense that they do not offer any advantage over a contingent
sequence of cash outlays.
In this paper we show that an exclusive role for securities grants arises in envi-
ronments where the enforcement of contracts is limited, so that firms cannot commit
to follow up on promises of cash compensation. In this case, firms can motivate their
employees with promises of deferred cash compensation only to the extent that such
promises are self-enforcing. Securities grants can provide a partial solution to this
inefficiency, as firms find it harder to renege on payments to shareholders than on
cash payments to employees. If we abstract from enforcement, the schedule of con-
tingent cash-flows provided by a given security grant can be awarded to an executive
by means of a contract that explicitly specifies the payment corresponding to each
state of nature. However, we argue below, companies’ (shareholders’) ability to re-
nege on the latter form of compensation is much greater. An executive will attach
a higher value to the security grant, implying that compensating management with
stock and/or options will increase shareholder value.
A vested2 stock grant is a sure claim to a risky cash flow, as it can be easily ex-
changed for cash once the eventual selling restrictions have expired. The same can be
said of a vested option grant, as it can be exchanged for a non-negative cash flow at
the exercise date. This is not the case for deferred cash payments, even when they are
part of an explicit contract. While systematic studies have not been conducted yet,
1This is the case for both static models such as Haubrich (1994), Holmstrom (1979), and Garen
(1994), and dynamic models such as Wang (1997) and Clementi and Cooley (2000).
2A stock or option grant vests when the grantee acquires ownership of the securities. Further
restrictions, however, may hinder him from selling the stock or exercising the options. In the remain-
der of this paper we will say that a grant is unrestricted when the shares (options) acquired by the
grantee can be freely disposed of (exercised).
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there is ample anecdotal evidence that firms do default on promises of cash payments
to employees, let them be wages, or medical and insurance benefits, or pensions, or
severance pay. Shleifer and Summers (1988) have argued that, in the case of many
corporate acquisitions, a large fraction of the increase in the target’s shareholder
value is due the acquirer’s ability to renege on employees’ long-term compensation
contracts. The ongoing US Airways reorganization process indicates that Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code allows corporations to default on their long-term obligations
towards current and past employees, in order to preserve their viability. Recently the
judge in charge of the case has allowed US Airways to terminate the pilots’ pension
plan as a necessary step to avoid liquidation. The recent boom in executive com-
pensation litigation provides further support for our hypothesis that the enforcement
of compensation contracts is imperfect. Utz (2001a,b) gives an account of the most
frequent causes of litigation and illustrates them with a short series of cases. Among
the most common disputes are those that concern the degree to which an employer
may amend or terminate a severance pay plan, therefore undermining the employee’s
ability to cash on the employer’s promise.3 A severance pay plan is a typical example
of what we refer to as an explicit promise of deferred cash compensation. We inter-
pret the large volume of severance pay litigation documented by Utz as a sign that
enforcement of such promises is imperfect and that employers successfully attempt to
renege on them.4
We build a simple two-period model of hidden action in which neither the firm
(principal) nor the manager (agent) can commit to long-term compensation contracts.
At the beginning of the second period the two agents will execute the continuation
of the long-term contract only if it provides each of them with payoffs greater than
their outside options. The remaining assumptions are standard. The probability
distribution of the firm’s profits depends in a natural way on the (unobservable) effort
exerted by the manager. The principal is risk-neutral, while the agent is risk-averse
3According to Utz (2001b), vesting standards dictated by the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act do not apply to the typical severance plan. For this reason, an employer’s ability to terminate
or amend the plan is largely unrestricted, except to the extent that the terms of the plan itself restrict
that right.
4One could argue that establishing an escrow account would allow firms to commit to deliver on at
least some of the promises of deferred cash compensation. After all, this is similar to what happens
in some European countries, where firms face tight restrictions on the use of funds accumulated to
cover pension benefits and severance pay. However, as long as external finance is more expensive than
internally generated funds, immobilizing funds in an escrow account is inefficient. This is the reason
why in the same European countries there is pressure towards relaxing the restrictions mentioned
above.
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and has disutility from effort.
If the compensation consists of cash payments only, then it is easy to show that
the optimal long-term contract collapses to a sequence of two independent static
contracts. This occurs because regardless of the profit realization, the firm will not
deliver to the manager a payoff greater than his outside value. In fact any larger
payoff would result in the firm breaching the contract and hiring a new executive.5
On the other hand, the manager will choose to quit whenever the continuation of the
long-term contract promises less than his outside value.
Things are different if at the end of the first period the firm can grant stock to
the manager and the size of the grant can be made contingent on firm performance.
Suppose that the owners breach the contract and fire the manager. The cost of
replacing him is now higher. In fact it equals the cost of hiring the substitute plus
the dilution of shareholder value induced by the increase in the number of shares
outstanding. For this reason, the firm can credibly commit to deliver to the manager
in period 2 a payoff higher than his outside value. In equilibrium the firm will take
up this opportunity, as it allows for better risk-sharing, and thus for a decrease in the
cost of delivering a given expected utility to the manager. Under our assumptions
on the market structure, this lower cost translates one to one into higher shareholder
value.
The evidence gathered by Utz (2001b) shows that in reality enforcement problems
arise also when securities are used, if the vesting of a stock or option grant is condi-
tional on the cause of the employee’s termination of employment. The reason is that
courts have a hard time verifying the actual reason for termination.6 In our model
shareholder value is larger when vesting can be made contingent on the type of sepa-
ration (i.e. when the courts can verify the reason of the termination). In particular,
shareholder value is maximal if vesting is denied when the manager quits. However,
we show that the introduction of securities grants always increases shareholder value,
even when enforcement problems do not allow for vesting to be contingent.
5Throughout the paper we assume that breaching the compensation contract is costless. This
assumption is made for the sake of simplicity and can be dispensed with. Our results still hold when
we relax it, as long as the cost of breaching is not too large.
6For example, Utz (2001b) argues that courts are often called to determine whether an employee’s
termination of employment was of a type causing the employee’s options to vest. In the case of
Tredway v. Merck & Co. the plaintiff refused to transfer to a 50/50 joint venture of Merk with
another organization, and took instead a job with an unrelated employer. The employee had received
stock options, which were not vested when he terminated his contract. The court determined that
this particular type of separation was not among the ones contemplated in the stock option plan, and
therefore ruled in favor of the employer, denying vesting of the option grant.
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There is very little (if any) theoretical work investigating the conditions under
which awarding securities is actually optimal. Since the current US tax code and
FASB standards discriminate across different means of compensation, it is likely that
tax and accounting considerations play an important role in shaping employees’ com-
pensation packages.7 In this paper we abstract completely from such considerations,
with the purpose of isolating the role of limited enforcement.
The research on the optimal design of securities grants is also in its infancy. Aseff
and Santos (2002) characterize the optimal stock option grant in a otherwise standard
hidden action model. Acharya et al. (2000) investigate the optimality of resetting
strike prices on previously-awarded option grants. In contrast to our work, in both of
these papers compensating the manager by means of securities is suboptimal, in the
sense that the use of contingent cash compensation would increase shareholder value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in
Section 2. In Section 3 we show how to solve for the optimal long-term compensation
contract with stock. In Section 4 we characterize the optimal compensation policy
and we show that the inclusion of stock grants in the compensation package increases
shareholder value. Section 5 considers the case in which the firm awards the CEO
call options instead of stock. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
There are two periods: t = 1, 2. We consider the problem of a firm that needs a
manager to operate in each period. There are many equally skilled individuals, each
of whom can be the firm’s manager. The firm is risk neutral and maximizes expected
discounted dividends. The manager’s preferences are described by the utility function
H(ct, et) = u(ct)− et,
where ct and et denote time t consumption and effort, respectively. We assume that
u : + →  and that u(·) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and
strictly concave. All agents discount future utility at the same rate δ, δ ∈ (0, 1).
7See Lipman (2001) for a readable but comprehensive account of the tax and accounting treatment
of the different components of managerial compensation. As an example of differential tax treatment,
the compensation originated by option grants that qualify as Incentive Stock Options according to
IRS guidelines is taxed at the long-term capital gain tax rate, which is lower than the marginal
income tax rate that applies to cash compensation. On the accounting side, it is well known that,
differently from cash compensation, the award of stock options does not generate any charge in the
income statement.
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We assume that for all t, et ∈ {0, a}, with a > 0. Further, let πt denote the
firm’s profit at time t (gross of manager’s cash compensation). We assume that for
all t, πt ∈ {πH , πL}, where 0 < πL < πH , and that prob(πt = πH | e = a) = ρ ,
prob(πt = πH | e = 0) = ρ , with ρ > ρ > 0.
The level of the manager’s effort is not observable to the firm and thus constitutes
private information for the manager. We assume that if a manager doesn’t work in
a given period, then he receives a constant consumption c∗. This implies that his
period reservation utility is ω = u(c∗).
At the beginning of period 1, the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
manager (i.e. to one of the many identical candidates for the job). The offer con-
sists a long-term compensation contract. It is long-term, in the sense that period-2
compensation is allowed to depend on both periods’ profit realizations.
Definition 1 A long-term compensation contract consists of contingent period-1 cash
payments {w1i}i=H,L, period-1 contingent stock grants {si}i=H,L, and period-2 con-
tingent cash payments {w2ij}i,j=H,L.8
The scalar si (si ∈ [0, 1]) denotes the fraction of equity that is granted to the
manager at the end of period 1, contingent on the realization of state i.
We assume that both parties have limited commitment to the contract, in the
following sense. At the beginning of period 2, both the firm and the manager can
unilaterally decide to breach the contract at no pecuniary cost. They will do so if
and only if the continuation values implied by the contract are lower than the values
of their outside opportunities. If the contract is breached, neither party will fulfill his
period-2 contractual obligations. The existing manager will become unemployed and
the firm will have to hire another.
Notice that we do require period-by-period commitment. In other words, the
beginning of period 2 is the only time in which the contract can be breached.9 We
say that the manager is fired whenever it is the firm that breaches the contract.
Alternatively, if the contract terminates because of the manager’s decision, we say
that he quit.
8When clarity of exposition is not at stake, time indices will be suppressed.
9Our assumption of limited commitment is similar to those used by Phelan (1995) and Kocher-
lakota (1996) among others in the dynamic contracting literature. Phelan (1995) studies a model
of moral hazard where commitment is one-sided. Kocherlakota (1996) considers two-sided limited
commitment in a model of hidden endowment.
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Figure 1: The Timing
2.1 Vesting and Sale Restrictions
We assume that in the case where the contract is not breached, vesting occurs at the
beginning of period 2. However, the manager is restricted from selling the stock until
period-2 uncertainty is resolved (i.e. until the end of the period). The same assump-
tions apply to the case in which the contract is terminated by the firm. Conditional
on the manager quitting the job, we consider three possible scenarios, identified as
A, B, and C, respectively. In scenarios A and B, the stock grant still vests at the
beginning of period 2. In scenario A the manager is allowed to sell upon vesting (i.e.
before period-2 uncertainty is resolved). In case B instead, he is restricted from sell-
ing until the end of the period (i.e. until period-2 uncertainty is resolved). Finally, in
case C, the manager does not retain the stock if he decides to quit the firm. Vesting
is denied.
3 Optimal Contracting
We solve for the optimal contract by backward induction. At the beginning of period
2, a stock holding s and a period-2 contingent cash payment (wH , wL) imply a level of
expected utility U for the manager. For every utility level U , we determine the pair
(wH(U, s), wL(U, s)) that delivers that utility efficiently (i.e. at the minimum cost
to the firm). Then we turn to period 1 and we solve for the optimal period-1 cash
compensation, stock grants (sH , sL), and promised future utility levels (UH , UL).
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3.1 Period 2
First, consider the problem of a firm that retained its manager at the end of period
1. The state variables of this problem are the manager’s promised utility U and
equity stake s. The manager’s consumption will be the sum of cash compensation
and dividends, that is c = w + s(π − w) = sπ + (1 − s)w. The value of the firm at
this stage is given by V2(s, U), where
V2(s, U) = max
wH ,wL
ρ [πH − wH ] + (1− ρ) [πL − wL] (P2)
subject to
ρu[(1− s)wH + sπH ] + (1− ρ)u[(1− s)wL + sπL]− a = U, (1)
ρu[(1− s)wH + sπH ] + (1− ρ)u[(1− s)wL + sπL]− a ≥
ρu[(1− s)wH + sπH ] + (1− ρ)u[(1− s)wL + sπL]. (2)
Condition (1) is the promise-keeping constraint. It requires that the contract
delivers exactly the promised utility U . Condition (2) is the incentive compatibility
constraint. Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to scenarios in which it is
always optimal for the firm to induce the manager to exert the high level of effort.
Next, consider a firm that fired its manager at the end of period 1 and hence
needs to hire a new one at the beginning of period 2. Given that there is an unlimited
supply of potential managers, the firm will offer to the new hire exactly his reservation
utility ω. Therefore, the firm’s outside value equals V2(0, ω), i.e. the value of the firm
when the manager in charge in period 2 does not hold stock and he is promised an
expected utility equal to his outside value. The new manager’s compensation contract
will consist of a schedule of contingent cash payments only.
The outside value for the manager consists of the utility he expects to receive as
of the beginning of period 2, conditional on quitting the firm. This value will depend
on the vesting clauses and sale restrictions that apply to the stock grant.
Risk aversion implies that in scenario A a manager that quits will liquidate his
position at the beginning of period 2. Therefore, his expected utility is given by
U(s) = UA(s) = u(c
∗ + sV2(0, ω)). (3)
In scenario B, the sale restriction will not allow him to dispose of the stock before
the end of the period. This implies that the payoff to quitting is
U(s) = UB(s) = ρu[c
∗ + s(πH − w∗H)] + (1− ρ)u[c∗ + s(πL − w∗L)], (4)
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where (w∗H , w
∗
L) are the cash compensations awarded to the newly-hired manager, i.e.
the solution to Problem (P2) when s = 0 and U = ω. Finally, in scenario C the
outgoing manager’s expected utility is simply
U(s) = UC(s) = ω. (5)
3.2 Period 1
At the beginning of period 1, the manager’s reservation utility is u(c∗) + δu(c∗) =
(1 + δ)ω. From our earlier discussion, the firm’s task at the beginning of period 1
is to choose the contract {(wi, si, Ui), i = H,L} that maximizes the value of current
shareholders. We recall that here wi denotes cash compensation in period 1, si is
the stock grant that the manager will receive at the end of period 1, and Ui defines
the manager’s expected utility in period 2. All three components of the contract are
contingent on the realization of state i in period 1. Therefore, the firm value at the
beginning of period 1 is:
V1 = max{wi,si∈[0,1],Ui}i=H,L
ρ[πH−wH+δ(1−sH)V2(sH , UH)]+(1−ρ)[πL−wL+δ(1−sL)V2(sL, UL)]
(P1)
subject to
ρ [u(wH) + δUH ] + (1− ρ) [u(wL) + δUL]− a ≥ (1 + δ)ω, (6)
ρ [u(wH) + δUH ] + (1− ρ) [u(wL) + δUL]− a ≥
ρ [u(wH) + δUH ] + (1− ρ) [u(wL) + δUL] , (7)
Ui ≥ U(si), i = H,L, (8)
V2(si, Ui) ≥ V2(0, ω), i = H,L. (9)
Conditions (6) and (7) are the individual rationality and incentive compatibility con-
straints, respectively. Condition (8) imposes that the manager must be offered a
continuation utility larger than his period-2 outside value. Condition (9) imposes
that the continuation value for the shareholders be greater than their value if they
fire the current manager and hire a new one in period 2. Constraints (8) and (9) are
the enforceability constraints.
3.3 Enforceability
For a given stock grant s, the only period-2 compensation schedules that the firm can
credibly commit to deliver are those that imply expected utility levels U that satisfy
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conditions (8) and (9). Such couples (s, U) are said to be enforceable. The notion of
enforceability is now formally introduced.
Definition 2 A pair (s, U) is said to be enforceable if U ≥ U(s) and V2(s, U) ≥
V2(0, ω).
We also define the enforceability correspondence Φ as
Φ(s) ≡ {U : U ≥ U(s), V2(s, U) ≥ V2(0, ω)} , s ∈ [0, 1].
Alternatively, when V2(s, U) is strictly decreasing in U , we can write
Φ(s) =
{
∅ if U(s) > U(s),
[U(s), U(s)] otherwise,
where ∀ s, U(s) solves
V2(s, U(s)) = V2(0, ω). (10)
Clearly, when V2(s, U) is strictly decreasing in U , then for all level of stock holding
s, U(s) is the highest expected utility the long-term contract can credibly promise to
the manager. The correspondence Φ(s) defines the set of continuation utility values
that the firm can credibly promise to its manager, conditional on awarding him an
equity stake s. It is immediate that, regardless of the the vesting clause and sale
restrictions, U(0) = U(0) = ω. Further, for all s ∈ (0, 1], UA(s) > UB(s) > UC(s). In
turn, these facts imply directly two properties of the enforceability correspondence,
that are stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1
1. For every vesting clause, Φ(0) = {ω}.
2. ∀ s ∈ [0, 1],ΦA(s) ⊆ ΦB(s) ⊂ ΦC(s).
The second result implies a weak ordering over the firm values in the three vesting
scenarios. In Scenario B, firm value will be weakly higher than in Scenario A and
weakly lower than in Scenario C. Therefore, a first prescription of our model is that
firms are always weakly better off by denying vesting in the event the employee quits
his job. In spite of this conclusion, it is still relevant to consider scenarios A and B.
In fact these are the only available alternatives if courts are unable to establish which
party was responsible for the termination of the contract, so that vesting cannot be
made contingent on this event.
In Section 4.2.2 we characterize the enforceability correspondence in the three
scenarios and we provide sufficient conditions for non-emptiness.
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4 Analysis
In this section we characterize the optimal compensation policy. We begin by ana-
lyzing the benchmark scenario in which stock grants are not allowed (i.e. the case of
s = 0). Then we proceed to consider the more interesting case in which stock grants
are used.
4.1 When stock grants are not allowed
Here we show that if the compensation package does not include stock grants, then
the long-term contract collapses to a sequence of static contracts. That is, the cash
compensation awarded in period 2 does not depend on period-1 profits.10
Proposition 1 If stock grants are not allowed, the optimal dynamic contract col-
lapses to a sequence of static contracts.
Proof. Consider Problem (P1). Set sH = sL = 0. Since Φ(0) = {ω}, it must be the
case that UH = UL = ω. This means that the manager’s utility in period 2 does not
depend on the first-period outcome. The value of the firm at the beginning of period
1 is then given by
V cash1 = maxwH ,wL
ρ [πH − wH ] + (1− ρ) [πL − wL] + δV2(0, ω)
subject to
ρu(wH) + (1− ρ)u(wL)− a = ω,
ρu(wH) + (1− ρ)u(wL)− a ≥ ρu(wH) + (1− ρ)u(wL).
We conclude that, in the case of s ≡ 0, the feasible sets of the programs (P1) and (P2)
are the same and the objective functions differ by an additive constant. Therefore, the
maximizers must be the same. The contingent cash compensations are equal across
periods. 
4.2 When stock grants are allowed (s ≥ 0)
Here we consider the general case in which the firm is allowed to include stock grants
in the manager’s compensation package. We find it useful to introduce the variable
ui, i = H,L. The value ui denotes the period-2 utility from consumption that the
manager receives in state i. We also denote the inverse of the utility function as v(·).
That is, we write v(u) ≡ u−1(u).
10This result holds in more general setups than ours. For example, see Kocherlakota (1996).
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4.2.1 Optimal period-2 compensation
Contingent on continuation of the contract, total firm value V2(s, U) is given by
V2(s, U) = max
uH ,uL
ρ [πH − wH ] + (1− ρ) [πL − wL] ,
subject to
ρuH + (1− ρ)uL − a = U, (11)
ρuH + (1− ρ)uL − a ≥ ρuH + (1− ρ)uL, (12)
wH = v(uH)
1
1− s −
s
1− sπH , (13)
wL = v(uL)
1
1− s −
s
1− sπL. (14)
Conditions (13) and (14) are derived from the definition of the newly-introduced
variable ui. In fact, we have that ui = u(sπi + (1− s)wi) ∀ i.11
Lemma 2 The incentive compatibility constraint (12) is binding at the optimum.
Proof. Rewrite condition (12) as (ρ−ρ)(uH −uL) ≥ a. Suppose that at the optimum
this constraint holds with strict inequality. Then, it is possible to decrease uH and
increase uL in such a way that both condition (11) and (12) are satisfied. However,
since the inverse of the utility function is strictly convex, the value of the firm is
now strictly higher. Obviously, this contradicts the assumption that the starting pair
(uH , uL) is optimal. 
In light of Lemma 2, we can use (11) and (12) to solve for the optimal pair (uH , uL).
We obtain
uH = U +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a, (15)
uL = U −
ρ
ρ− ρ a. (16)
Substituting (15) and and (16) in the objective function, we obtain that
V2(s, U) =
1
1− s [π − f(U ; a)] , (17)
11Notice that the high effort level e = a is not always implementable. In fact condition (12)
implies that uH ≥ uL + aρ−ρ . The latter, together with condition (11), requires that U ≥ uL +
aρ
ρ−ρ .
Finally, since wL ≥ 0, it must hold that U ≥ u(sπL)+ aρρ−ρ . Therefore a sufficient, albeit not necessary
condition for e = a to be implementable for every pair (s, U) such that U ≥ ω, is that ω ≥ u(πL)+ aρρ−ρ .
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where, for every x, the function f(x; a) is defined as
f(x; a) ≡ ρv
(
x+
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a
)
+ (1− ρ)v
(
x− ρ
ρ− ρ a
)
.
Notice that f(x; a) defines the expected cost to the firm of delivering to the manager
the period-2 utility level x, conditional on the recommended effort level being a. It
is easy to show that the function f is strictly increasing and strictly convex in x, for
any given a.
4.2.2 The enforceability correspondence Φ(s)
By (17), the outside value for the firm at the beginning of period 2 is given by
V2(0, ω) = π − f(ω; a).
Therefore, it follows that
U(s) = f−1 [f(ω; a) + s(π − f(ω; a))] .
Given the properties of f , if π > f(ω; a), then
U
′(s) > 0 ∀ s.
This simply says that the utility the firm can commit to deliver to its manager in-
creases monotonically in the size of the stock grant. It is the formal statement of
the idea that motivated our work. Accordingly, from now on we will maintain the
following assumption:
Assumption 1 π > f(ω; a).
Showing that granting stock increases the firm’s ability to reward its manager in the
future, is not enough. In fact, if U(s) < U(s) for some s, awarding to the manager an
equity stake s will make it optimal for him to breach the contract and quit. We need
to provide conditions that insure that the correspondence Φ is nonempty. In Scenario
C, it is clear that this is always the case for all s, since UC(s) = ω ∀s ∈ [0, 1]. In
scenarios A and B, non-emptiness of Φ is not a general property.
Since the value function V2(s, U) is strictly decreasing in U , Φ(s) is not empty if
and only if
V2(s, U(s)) ≥ V2(0, ω). (18)
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In turn, condition (17) implies that the latter holds if and only if
f(U(s); a)− s[π − f(ω; a)] ≤ f(ω; a). (19)
Proposition 2 states a condition under which, in both scenarios A and B, the set Φ(s)
is non-empty in an interval that includes {0}.
Proposition 2 If
ρv′
(
ω +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a
)
+ (1− ρ)v′
(
ω − ρ
ρ− ρ a
)
< v′(ω), (20)
then there exist values sA, sB, 0 < sA < sB ≤ 1, such that ΦA(s) is non-empty over
[0, sA] and ΦB(s) is non-empty over [0, sB].
Proof. Consider case A first. For s = 0, condition (19) holds with equality. Therefore,
we just need to show that
f(UA(s); a)− s[π − f(ω; a)] (21)
is decreasing in s at s = 0. The first derivative of (21) with respect to s, evaluated at
s = 0, is given by
V2(0, ω)
{
u′(c∗)
[
ρv′
(
ω +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a
)
+ (1− ρ)v′
(
ω − ρ
ρ− ρ a
)]
− 1
}
. (22)
Given our assumptions on the utility function, the derivative is a continuous function.
Therefore, if (22) is negative, there exists sA > 0 such that ΦA(s) is non-empty over
[0, sA]. Finally, this is equivalent to requiring that
ρv′
(
ω +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a
)
+ (1− ρ)v′
(
ω − ρ
ρ− ρ a
)
< v′(ω).
Since f is a strictly increasing function and UB(s) < UA(s) ∀ s, it follows that for all
s > 0 such that ΦA(s) is non-empty, ΦA(s) ⊂ ΦB(s). Further, there is a non-empty
interval (sA, sB] such that ΦA(s) = ∅ and ΦB(s) = ∅ ∀ s ∈ (sA, sB]. 
In Figure 2, we plot the difference U(s) − U(s) in a parametric case in which
u(c) = c1−σ, σ < .5, so that condition (20) is satisfied. Notice that sA < 1 and
sB = 1.
When condition (20) does not hold, it can be the case that the enforceability
correspondence is empty on an interval immediately to the right of s = 0, but it is
non-empty for larger values of s.12
12By the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 2, it is easy to show that when v′(·) is
strictly convex, the enforceability correspondence is empty for s close enough to 0, in both scenarios.
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Figure 2: U(s)− U(s)
4.2.3 The firm’s problem in period 1
Let now V stock1 denote the value of the firm at the beginning of period 1. Such value
is given by
V stock1 = max{ui,si,Ui}i=H,L
ρ[πH − v(uH) + δ(1− sH)V2(sH , UH)]+
(1− ρ)[πL − v(wL) + δ(1− sL)V2(sL, UL)]
subject to
ρ[uH + δUH ] + (1− ρ)[uL + δUL]− a = (1 + δ)ω, (23)
ρ[uH + δUH ] + (1− ρ)[uL + δUL]− a ≥ ρ[uH + δUH ] + (1− ρ)[uL + δUL], (24)
Ui ∈ Φ(si), i = H,L. (25)
Using (17), it is easy to show that
V stock1 = − min{ui,si,Ui}i=H,Lρ [v(uH) + δf(UH ; a)] + (1− ρ) [v(uL) + δf(UL; a)]− (1 + δ)π
subject to (23), (24), (25).
Proposition 3 is our main result. It shows that the ability to award stock grants
allows the firm to partially overcome its lack of commitment. Including stock grants
in the compensation package allows to make period-2 compensation contingent on
first-period outcomes, thereby increasing shareholder value. Proposition 3 applies to
Lemma 3 in Appendix B shows that in scenario A strict concavity of v′(·) is actually necessary for
non emptiness, for all s. This implies, for example, that if u(c) = log(c), then ΦA(s) = ∅ for all
s ∈ (0, 1]. In Lemma 4 we give a necessary condition under which ΦB(s) = ∅ for any fixed s > 0 for
a class of utility functions including u(c) = log(c).
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Figure 3: Enforceability Correspondence.
all cases in which Φ(s) is nonempty on an interval [0, s∗], for some s∗ ∈ (0, 1]. In
scenario C, this is always true. By Proposition 2, we know that when condition (20)
holds, it is true regardless of the vesting clause. Figure 3 presents a typical case in
which the assumption of Proposition 3 is satisfied.
The analysis of the optimal contract in the case in which Φ(s) = ∅ in an interval
immediately to the right of s = 0 is included in Appendix A. It turns out that the
results stated in Proposition 3 hold true also in that case, provided that a further
condition is imposed.
Proposition 3 If Φ(s) is non-empty over [0, s∗] for s∗ ∈ (0, 1], then the following
conditions are necessary for optimality:
1. UL = ω,
2. UH > ω,
3. sH > 0.
Proof. Since the function f(x; a) is strictly convex in x, one can use the argument
used in the proof of Lemma 2 to show that, in solution, condition (24) holds with
equality. Therefore, using (23) and (24), we get that
uH + δUH = ω(1 + δ) +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a
uL + δUL = ω(1 + δ)−
ρ
ρ− ρ a
15
Then, necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum are:
v′[ω(1 + δ) +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a− δUH ]−
∂f(UH ; a)
∂UH
≤ 0 (26)
v′[ω(1 + δ)− ρ
ρ− ρ a− δUL]−
∂f(UL; a)
∂UL
≤ 0 (27)
Notice that the left hand side of (27) is a monotone decreasing function of UL. It is
straightforward to show that for UL = ω such function assumes a strictly negative
value. This implies that it is optimal to choose UL = ω. The left-hand side of (26)
is also strictly decreasing in UH and it is immediate to show that for UH = ω, it
assumes a strictly positive value. Therefore in solution UH > ω. Then, enforceability
also implies that sH > 0. In fact, U(0) = ω. 
A corollary of Proposition 3 is that the value of the firm is now higher than in
Section 4.2. This is the case, because the possibility of awarding stock grants enables
the firm to use both current and deferred compensation as incentive devices in Period
1. For given outside value ω, a positive spread between UH and UL implies a lower
spread between uH and uL. In turn, by strict concavity of the utility function, this
implies a lower expected compensation, and thus higher firm value.
Corollary 1 V stock1 > V
cash
1 .
Proof. The value V cash1 is the value of Problem (P1) under the restriction that sH =
sL = 0. This proves that V cash1 ≤ V stock1 . The fact that the inequality is strict follows
from the observation that Problem (P1) defines the maximization of a strictly concave
function over a strictly convex set, and therefore admits only one maximizer. 
By Lemma 1, we know that firm value in Scenario B will be weakly higher than in
scenario A and weakly lower than in Scenario C. Notice, however, that if in scenario
A the upper bound s∗ is so large that the constraint UH ≤ U(s∗) does not bind, then
the optimal compensation contract (and therefore firm value) is the same across the
three vesting scenarios.
5 Stock Option Grants
In the previous section we have established that in an environment characterized
by imperfect contractual enforcement, including stock grants in the compensation
packages has the potential to increase shareholder value.
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This results depends crucially on the assumption that the firm can commit to
actually grant stock at the end of period 1. In this section we investigate how the
contract changes once we dispense with this hypothesis. We consider the case in which
the firm replaces the contingent stock grant with options awarded at the beginning
of time (i.e. when the contract is signed). Under the new circumstance, the payoff
accruing to the manager from the option grant still depends on the firm’s performance
in the first period, but it is not subject to the owners’ discretion.
We assume that the compensation contract consists of cash compensation and a
stock option grant (z, P ), to be awarded at the beginning of time and exercisable
at the end of period 1. With z we denote the largest fraction of the firm that the
manager can acquire, should he decide to exercise. In other words, z is the size of
the option grant, measured as a percentage of total equity. We denote the exercise
price (or, rather, the exercise total value) of the option, as P . Notice that once the
manager has decided how many options to exercise, the firm’s problem is the same
as in the previous sections. This means that we can focus on period-1 problem. The
value of the firm is given by
V opt1 = max
z,P,{wi,si∈[0,z],Ui(s)}i=H,L
ρ[πH − wH + δ(1− sH)V2(sH , UH)]+ (P3)
(1− ρ)[πL − wL + δ(1− sL)V2(sL, UL)]
subject to
ρ [u(wH − sHP ) + δUH(sH)] + (1− ρ) [u(wL − sLP ) + δUL(sL)]− a = (1 + δ)ω,
(28)
ρ [u(wH − sHP ) + δUH(sH)] + (1− ρ) [u(wL − sLP ) + δUL(sL)]− a ≥
ρ [u(wH − sHP ) + δUH(sH)] + (1− ρ) [u(wL − sLP ) + δUL(sL)] , (29)
sH = arg max
s∈[0,z]
u(wH − sP ) + δUH(s), (30)
sL = arg max
s∈[0,z]
u(wL − sP ) + δUL(s), (31)
Ui(s) ≥ U(s), i = H,L, s ∈ [0, z], (32)
V2(s, Ui(s)) ≥ V2(0, ω), i = H,L, s ∈ [0, z]. (33)
The firm chooses the option grant (z, P ) and the amount of options si ∈ [0, z] that it
wishes the manager to exercise, should state i occur. Constraints (30) and (31) impose
that it is optimal for the manager to exercise si. The variable Ui(s) is the expected
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continuation utility awarded to the manager, should state i occur, and should the
manager exercise exactly s options. Conditions (32) and (33) impose that all promised
utilities are enforceable, both on and off the equilibrium path.
A relevant feature of this contract is that period-2 wages are conditional on the
exercise decision of the manager. That is, conditional on a given realization (high
or low), two managers that exercise different quantities of their options may end up
receiving different cash wages in period 2. It is the nature of the optimal contract
that the cash payments can be adjusted according to realizations of the states. This
may seem a little unusual but we would argue that it is not. It is not uncommon for
managers whose options finish out of the money to have compensation adjusted in
subsequent periods. This is the spirit of the discussion in Acharya et al. (2000).
5.1 Analysis
For simplicity, we limit our analysis to Scenario A. Notice first that the continuation
utilities off the equilibrium path do not enter the objective function or any of the
constraints, except for conditions (30) and (31). Therefore, without loss of generality,
off the equilibrium path we can set Ui(s) = U(s), ∀s. That is, if the manager deviates
from the suggested exercise policy, he will get his outside value. For any i, let also:
s(wi, P ) ≡ arg max
s∈[0,z]
u(wi − sP ) + δU(s).
The quantity s(wi, P ) is the fraction of options that the manager exercises if faced
with a first-period wage wi, exercise price P , and continuation utility U(s). In other
words, s(wi, P ) is the manager’s optimal deviation. As in the previous sections, let
ui ≡ u(wi − siP ). Since the incentive compatibility constraint (29) binds, we can use
(28) and (29) to obtain
uH + δUH(sH) = (1 + δ)ω +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a,
uL + δUL(sL) = (1 + δ)ω −
ρ
ρ− ρ a.
Finally, again without loss of generality, let z = max(sH , sL). Then, the problem of
the firm can be rewritten as follows:
V opt1 = − min
P,{si∈[0,z],Ui}i=H,L
ρ [v(uH) + δf(UH ; a)] + (1− ρ) [v(uL) + δf(UL; a)]− (1 + δ)π,
subject to
Ui ∈ Φ(si), i = H,L,
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u(wH − s(wH , P )P ) + δU(s(wH , P )) ≤ (1 + δ)ω +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a, (34)
u(wL − s(wL, P )P ) + δU(s(wL, P )) ≤ (1 + δ)ω −
ρ
ρ− ρ a, (35)
uH = (1 + δ)ω +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a− δUH ,
uL = (1 + δ)ω −
ρ
ρ− ρ a− δUL,
wH = sHP + v
[
(1 + δ)ω +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a− δUH)
]
,
wL = sLP + v
[
(1 + δ)ω − ρ
ρ− ρ a− δUL)
]
.
Notice that conditions (34) and (35) are the reformulation of conditions (30) and (31).
Proposition 4 states that the contract with stock options implies a firm value that
is lower than the contract with stock grants. The intuition is simple. In order to
replicate the allocation achieved with stock grants, the compensation contract with
options must be such that in the high state the manager exercises a quantity of options
equal to the stock grant. In the low state, instead, he must find it convenient not to
exercise any option. In general such a contract does not exist. Proposition 4 states
also that the contract with options performs strictly better than the contract with
cash compensation only. The reason is that, contrary to the contract with cash only,
the contract with options allows continuation utilities UH and UL to differ.
Proposition 4 The values V cash1 , V
stock
1 , V
opt
1 satisfy V
cash
1 < V
opt
1 ≤ V stock1 .
Proof. The fact that V opt1 ≤ V stock1 follows directly from the observation that V opt1
maximizes the same function as V stock1 , but on a smaller feasibility set. To prove
that V cash1 < V
opt
1 , we will show that there exists a feasible, and possibly sub-optimal
contract with options, that delivers a firm value strictly larger than V cash1 . Let sL = 0
and UL = ω, so that wL = v
(
ω +
ρ
ρ−ρ a
)
. Such choices imply that, conditional on
the low state occurring, the manager will receive the same utility awarded by the
optimal contract with cash. Further, let P = δ V2(0,ω)u
′(c∗)
u′(wL)
. At such exercise price, it
is optimal for the manager to exercise zero options in the low state. Finally, whatever
sH , set UH = U(sH). Now we just need to show that there exists a couple (wH , sH),
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with sH > 0, such that the two following conditions hold:
u(wH − sHP ) + δU(sH) = (1 + δ)ω +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a, (36)
−Pu′(wH − sHP ) + δV2(0, ω)u′(c∗ + sHV2(0, ω)) ≥ 0. (37)
Condition (37) requires that it is optimal for the manager to exercise sH options in
the high state. Recall that u(wL)+ δU(0) = (1+ δ)ω− ρρ−ρ a. Therefore, there exists
a value wH , with wH > wL, such that u(wH)+ δU(0) = (1+ δ)ω+
1−ρ
ρ−ρ a. Given that
u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, it follows that −Pu′(wH) + δV2(0, ω)u′(c∗) > 0. Then, by continuity
of u′, there exist strictly positive values sH , and wages wH(sH) implied by (36), such
that the pairs (sH , wH(sH)) satisfy (37). 
The main lesson of Proposition 4 is that, even if enforcement problems are so severe
that contingent grants of stock are not available, awarding call options has still the
potential to increase shareholder value. Proposition 4 also says that, in general,
shareholder value is higher when stock is granted. Obviously this does not imply
that in reality firms should always reward managers with stock bonus plans instead
of option grants. There are other factors, not considered in our model, that might
make options more appealing than stock. In particular, we refer to the differential
tax and accounting treatment of stock and option grants. Our analysis just points
out that when considering the role of securities grants as a partial solution to the
commitment problem generated by imperfect enforcement of compensation contracts,
option grants do not have any advantage over stock grants.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a simple model of the relationship between a firm
and its manager. We have shown that if the enforcement of compensation contracts is
imperfect, cash compensation and stock grants are no longer perfectly substitutable
means to compensate managers. By awarding stock, a company is able to overcome
(at least partially) its lack of commitment and can credibly promise to deliver con-
tinuation utility levels that are higher than the manager’s reservation utility. As a
consequence, deferred compensation can be made contingent on current performance.
By using both current and deferred compensation for incentive purposes, a firm can
provide its manager with a given utility level at a lower cost, therefore increasing
shareholder value. Our analysis also shows that if the commitment problems gener-
ated by imperfect enforcement are so severe so as to make contingent stock grants
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unavailable, firms can still improve over only-cash compensation, by awarding op-
tions. In our environment, stock grants outperform call options as a way to discipline
managers. However, our setup omits many of the relevant features which may be
important for preferring options to stock grants.
In the introduction we have argued that the literature on the design of optimal
compensation contracts is still in its infancy. It is our opinion that further work in the
area is warranted, as it could be useful to both companies’ compensation committees
and regulators. In particular, we think it would be of interest to study environments
where the manager not only chooses effort, but also the riskiness of its projects and/or
the information flow reaching the investors.13
13Carpenter (2000) studies the investment problem of a risk-averse manager compensated with
options. However, options are not optimal in her environment.
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A Optimal Contract with Stock: Complete Analysis
In this appendix, we generalize our result in Proposition 3 to the cases where Φ(s) is
not necessarily non-empty over [0, s∗] for some s∗ ∈ (0, 1]. One such case is depicted
in Figure 4.
Let Φ˜ ≡ {U : ∃ s ∈ [0, 1] such that U ∈ Φ(s).} That is, Φ˜ is the set of
all values of U that are enforceable (together with some s ∈ [0, 1]). Finally, let
Umin ≡ min{U : U ∈ Φ˜, U = ω}. In other words, except ω, Umin is the lowest
enforceable U .
Proposition 5 (i) The optimal contract has UL = ω. (ii) Suppose Umin is sufficiently
close to ω (in the sense to be made precise in the proof). Then the optimal contract
must also have sH > 0 and UH > ω.
Proof. The proof of (i) is the same as in Proposition 3. To prove (ii), notice that
UH = arg min
UH∈Φ˜
⋃{ω}F (UH) ≡ u
−1
(
ω(1 + δ) +
1− ρ
ρ− ρ a− δUH
)
+ δf(UH ; a).
Since the function F is strictly convex and strictly decreasing at ω, it follows that
UH > ω if and only if F (Umin) ≤ F (ω). Finally, the enforceability condition UH ∈
Φ(sH) implies sH > 0. 
We now reconsider the numerical example introduced in Section 4.2.2 where u(c) =
log(c), δ = 0.75, πL = 0.01, πH = 1.0, ρ = 0.0, ρ = 0.5, a = 1.0, ω = log(0.0001) =
−9.21. Figure 5 plots the function F (UH). Clearly, in this example, F (Umin) ≤ F (ω).
Therefore we have sH > 0 at the optimum.
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B Lemmas
Lemma 3 If ∀ e ∈ [0, a]
v′
[
U(s) +
1−ρ
ρ−ρ e
]
− v′
[
ω +
1−ρ
ρ−ρ e
]
v′
[
U(s)− ρρ−ρ e
]
− v′
[
ω − ρρ−ρ e
] > ρ(1− ρ)
ρ(1− ρ) ,
then ΦA(s) = ∅.
Proof. By (17), U(s) satisfies
v (U(s)) = c∗ + s [π − f(ω; a)] ,
which is equivalent to
f (U(s); 0)− f (ω; 0) = s [π − f(ω; a)] .
On the other hand, ΦA(s) = ∅ if and only if
f (U(s); a)− f (ω; a) > s [π − f(ω; a)] .
Sufficient condition for this is that
∂
∂e
[f(U(s); e)− f(ω; e)] > 0 ∀ e. (38)
It turns out that
∂f(x; e)
∂e
= ρ
1− ρ
ρ− ρ v
′
(
x+
1− ρ
ρ− ρ e
)
− (1− ρ) ρ
ρ− ρ v
′
(
x− ρ
ρ− ρ e
)
.
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Then, since ρ− ρ > 0 and v′′ > 0, (38) holds if and only if
v′
[
U(s) +
1−ρ
ρ−ρ e
]
− v′
[
ω +
1−ρ
ρ−ρ e
]
v′
[
U(s)− ρρ−ρ e
]
− v′
[
ω − ρρ−ρ e
] > ρ(1− ρ)
ρ(1− ρ) .

Lemma 4 Assume limc→0 u(c) = −∞. Then, for any s ∈ (0, 1] there exist c∗ > 0
and πL > 0 such that ΦB(s) = ∅.
Proof. Consider any s ∈ (0, 1]. Using (14) and (16), it is easy to obtain
πL − w∗L =
1
1− s
[
πL − v
(
ω − ρ
ρ− ρ a
)]
.
Now recall that by (4),
UB(s) = ρu[c
∗ + s(πH − w∗H)] + (1− ρ)u[c∗ + s(πL − w∗L)].
Since limu→−∞ v(u) = 0, for every u > −∞ there exist c∗ > 0 and πL > 0 such that
UB(s) < u.
On the other hand, it is also the case that limω→−∞ f(ω; a) = 0. In turn, this
implies that, for any couple (ω, πL),
U(s) = f−1[f(ω; a) + s(π¯ − f(ω; a))] > f−1(sρπH).
Therefore, it is enough to pick values c∗ > 0 and πL > 0 such that UB(s) <
f−1(sρπH). 
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